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Responses
SOME REALISM ABOUT JUDGES:
A REPLY TO EDWARDS AND LIVERMORE
RICHARD

A. POSNERt

For some years I have been arguing for a realistic approach to
understanding judicial behavior. That approach is challenged in a
recent article by Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit and Mr. Michael Livermore, the executive
director of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University
School of Law.2
What I am calling the "realistic approach" is, most simply, the
view that judges play a legislative role in many cases, and those
usually the most important ones-the ones that shape the law or have
an immediate effect on society. And they play that role not only in
common law cases and other areas of explicitly judge-made law but
also in the interpretation of statutes and-of course-of the U.S.
Constitution. The opposing approach, which I call the "legalistic
approach," pictures judges as oracles, engaged in applying law stated
in orthodox legal sources, such as statutory or constitutional text or
judicial decisions having the status of precedents, and doctrines built
from those decisions, to the facts of new cases. Judges in this picture
are transmitters of law, not creators, just as the oracle at Delphi was

Copyright © 2010 by Richard A. Posner.
t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. This Reply is a revised draft of a talk given on September 25, 2009 at a
conference on political science and law held at Northwestern University Law School's Searle
Center. An earlier draft of the Reply was given at faculty workshops at Harvard and Yale Law
Schools, and the Author thanks the participants at the workshops for their comments, as well as
Lee Epstein for her very helpful comments on the earlier draft.
1. See, for example, my article, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 1 (1994). The fullest explanation of my approach
is in my recent book How JUDGES THINK (2008).
2. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt
to Understandthe FactorsAffecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009).
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the passive transmitter of Apollo's prophecies. The analogy of judge
to oracle was Blackstone's, who went so far as to argue that even
common law judges were oracles, engaged in translating immemorial
custom into legal doctrines rather than in legislating doctrines.3
The realistic view goes back to Plato's dialogue Gorgias-before
there even was a legal profession or professional judges; we find it in
Bentham, famously in Holmes (and less bluntly in Cardozo), in legal
realism, later in political science, and then in economics and in critical
legal studies. Though Holmes is venerated by lawyers and judges, the
legalistic view continues to dominate professional discourse about
judging. The reason is that lawyers and judges-particularly judgeslike to think that judicial decisionmaking is an "objective" activity,
that decisions are produced by analysis. No one today thinks the
process wholly oracular. But the idea of the judge as an analyst shares
with the idea of the judge as an oracle the assumption that legal
questions always have right answers: answers that can be produced by
transmission from an authoritative source, though in the modern view
the transmission is not direct but is mediated by analysis. And the
judge remains an oracle in the sense that his personality does not
count. The personality of the oracle at Delphi was no more important
than the personality of a coaxial cable. To the legalist, a judge is a
calculating machine. To the realist, he or she is a typical human being,
whose judicial votes, because they are not generated by a process that
resembles the operation of the scientific method or the rules of logic,
are influenced by life experiences, professional training and
experiences, political ideology, temperament, personal-identity
characteristics such as race and sex, energy, ambition, sentiment, taste
for leisure or for hard work, cognitive quirks, training and
intelligence, and the other influences on human behavior. Out of
these elements some judges (and more law professors) have built
elaborate theories-law as the quest for original meanings, law as
active liberty, law as libertarianism, law as integrity, and so forth-but
these the realist regards more as rationalizations of dispositions than
as theories that actually guide decisions and can be verified or
refuted, rather than simply accepted or rejected.
The realistic approach to judicial behavior is challenged in the
article by Judge Edwards and Mr. Livermore, to which I now turn. I
will not try to go through the article page by page, registering my

3.

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
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disagreement with the points made by the authors; with many of their
points I have no disagreement. I will confine this reply to the seven
points with which I disagree.
1. Legalistically Indeterminate Cases Shape the Law. The authors
say that the realists exaggerate the degree to which judges are unable
to achieve agreement through deliberation that, overriding
ideological and other differences, generates an objectively correct
decision. Their evidence for the charge of exaggeration is that even in
the Supreme Court many decisions are unanimous though the
Justices are ideologically diverse; and "many" becomes "most" in the
federal courts of appeals' (I do not know the situation in the state
court system).
But no realist has ever denied that most judicial decisions are
legalistic. Legalism is a category of realistic judicial decisionmaking.
Legalistic doctrines such as plain meaning and stare decisis enable
judges to economize on their time and effort; to minimize controversy
with other branches of government by appearing to play a modest,
technical, "professional" role (in the sense in which members of
professions seek deference from the laity on the basis of their real or
pretended specialized knowledge); and to provide a productreasonably predictable law-that is socially valued and therefore
justifies the judges' privileges. I do not doubt moreover that some
judges think that every case, however novel and difficult, can be
resolved by reference to an authoritative text, statutory (or
constitutional) or judicial. But realism, or at least the form of realism
that I defend, is not a theory of judicial self-consciousness. Whatever
judges think they are doing, they cannot resolve a novel case
legalistically because a novel case is one to which the orthodox legal
materials of text and precedent do not speak beyond furnishing ideas
of policy that might be used to "legislate" the outcome of the novel
case.
The mistake in equating unanimity (absence of published
dissent) with agreement is that judges do not always dissent publicly
from a decision with which they disagree. I have discussed what I call
"dissent aversion ' 5 elsewhere and will not repeat the discussion here.

4. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1941-44.
5. POSNER, supra note 1,at 32-34; see also Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Nov. 13, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).

HeinOnline -- 59 Duke L.J. 1179 2009-2010

1180

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1177

A more important point (since dissent aversion is much less
pronounced in the Supreme Court than in the courts of appeals) is
that the cases that can be decided by the methods of legalism are not
the cases that shape the law, the novel cases. Today's law, insofar as it
is the product of judicial decisions, is the product of decisions that
were stabs in the dark rather than applications of settled law. Some of
those cases were unanimous, such as Brown v. Board of Education,6
but that decision was not arrived at by legalistic analysis and could
not have been. It was the product of political agreement-a shared
repugnance to racial segregation viewed as antithetical to evolving
American values.
Even Judge Edwards says that 5 to 15 percent of cases decided
by his court are indeterminate from a legalist standpoint. If one
cumulates those figures over many years and many courts, it is
apparent that an immense number of decisions are legalistically
indeterminate; and among them, as I have said, are the decisions that
have made the law what it is today. (Just compare the text of the
Constitution with the body of modern constitutional doctrine, or for
that matter the text of the Sherman Act with the body of modern
antitrust law.)
2. Proxy Problems. The authors point out that the standard
realist variable in empirical studies of judicial behavior-the party of
the president who appointed the judge who cast the vote in
question-explains only a fraction of judges' votes. 8 And that is true.
It is true because the variable is a crude proxy for ideological leanings
(in part because the political parties are not ideologically uniform),
and no proxy at all for the other nonlegalistic factors that I
mentioned, such as background and temperament, that influence
judicial votes. Yet despite its crudeness, the proxy has been found in
numerous studies to have significant explanatory effect, even after
correcting for other variables that might influence a judge's votes.9
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1898.
8. Id. at 1942.
9. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 151 (2006); Christina L.
Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 20 n.3), available at http://epstein.law.
northwestern.edu/research/genderjudging.html; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Rational JudicialBehavior: A StatisticalStudy, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 786 (2009); Daniel R.
Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS.
J. 219, 243 (1999).
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3. JudicialSelf-Reporting. Judge Edwards in his part of the joint
paper gives heavy weight to what judges-in fact, to what Judge
Edwards-reports about how they decide to vote in a case as they
do.'0 The assumption is that judicial self-reporting-judicial
introspection-is a valid source of knowledge. I am skeptical,
especially when it conforms closely to the "party line" on judicial
decisionmaking. For largely political reasons-mainly to avoid
seeming to compete with the other branches of government in making
policy-most judges most of the time downpedal the creative or
legislative role in judging. Sometimes the parade of modesty becomes
ludicrous, as when John Roberts at his confirmation hearing said that
the role of a Supreme Court Justice, which he would faithfully
inhabit, was similar to that of a baseball umpire who calls balls and
strikes but does not make or alter the rules of baseball." That was so
ridiculous, and Chief Justice Roberts is so sophisticated, that it cannot
be what he actually thought. I am not suggesting that he is
hypocritical. Judicial confirmation hearings have become a farce in
which a display of candor would be suicide. It would also be a
mistake. It would be to commit what philosophers call a "category
mistake." It would be equivalent to a Shakespearean actor
interrupting his recital of Hamlet's "To be, or not to be" soliloquy by
saying that he did not actually think that death was "a consummation
devoutly to be wished"; he was just saying it because it was in the
script he had been given.
But much of the judicial self-reporting is, I think, sincere, though
not, by virtue of that, reliable; we have all heard of "cognitive
dissonance" and how people will fool themselves in order to erase it.
There is a well-defined "official" judicial role and most judges would
be uncomfortable if they realized that in reality they were playing a
different role. So they suppress the realization. My earlier example
was of a judge who can think in legalist categories, and so when he
votes in a novel case, a case that does not fit those categories, he is
legislating unconsciously.
I do not deny that judicial introspection can play a valid role in
studies of judicial behavior. But it could do so only as a source of
hypotheses to be tested. Many of my own views about judicial

10. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1950-58.
11. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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behavior were arrived at by introspection, but I do not expect anyone
to be convinced by them unless I present evidence; my say-so is not
evidence and neither is Judge Edwards's.
4. Rhetoric Is Weak Evidence. A related point made in defense

of the legalist approach as a description of actual judicial behavior is
that most judicial opinions are legalistic in style. They cite prior
decisions as if those decisions really were binding, reason by analogy,
give great weight to statutory and even constitutional language, delve
into history for clues to original meaning, and so forth. But that is
what one would expect if most judges think of themselves as legalists;
or if most judicial opinions are largely written by law clerks (as they
are), who are inveterate legalists because they lack the experience or
confidence or "voice" to write a legislative opinion of the kind that
Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Jackson, Traynor, or Friendly wrote; or if
judges think the legalist pose politically useful, as conveying a
becoming modesty and avoiding conflict with rival branches of
government. Judges have political reasons to represent creativity as
continuity, and innovation as constraint; and as there is no recognized
duty of candor in judicial opinion writing, they cannot be accused of
hypocrisy in writing that way even if they are aware that it does not
track their actual decisional process.
5. Law Suffused with Politics. The strongest rhetorical move by

legalists is to call the legalist approach "law" and the realist approach
"politics." It is effective rhetoric because it makes a "realist" judge
seem like someone who flouts the judicial oath-which requires a
judge to uphold the law-and thus a usurper, and realist discourse a
blueprint for usurpation.
But this rhetoric reflects and perpetuates a misunderstanding of
the nature of American law. That law is suffused with politics (in the
ideological rather than the partisan sense-few federal judges have,
or at least exhibit in their decisions, a strong sense of party loyalty).
Constitutional law, which is law made by the Supreme Court by loose
interpretation of the antiquated constitutional text, is political in the
sense of being the product not of orthodox legal materials
(authoritative text plus precedents) but of the values, political in a
broad (but sometimes in a rather narrow) sense, of the Justices. That
does not make their decisions "lawless." The primary duty of a judge
is to decide cases, and this duty is not waived merely because the
judge confronts a case, as he often will, that cannot be decided simply
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by reference to orthodox judicial materials-that can be decided only
by making a value or policy choice, a choice that inevitably will be
influenced by political ideology, career and personal background, and
a variety of psychological factors. The critics of the realist approach
either do not acknowledge these obvious facts about the American
judicial system or are unable to come up with a competing theory of
judicial motivations.
Judge Edwards and Mr. Livermore, however, do not make this
mistake. Judge Edwards acknowledges that the American conception
of law "encompasses, at least in some circumstances, forms of moral
or political reasoning. ' ' 12 But why does he call it "reasoning"? What
exactly is moral and political reasoning? Edwards does not explain.
Had he said moral and political beliefs, we would be in agreement.
Such beliefs are less likely to be the product of a reasoning process
than of temperament, upbringing, religious affiliation, personal and
professional experiences, and characteristics of personal identity such
as race and sex.'3
6. ExaggeratedSignificance of Deliberation. Recognizing though

he does that there is a considerable area of indeterminacy in law
viewed from a legalistic perspective, Judge Edwards falls back on the

idea of deliberation as a way of overcoming indeterminacy. 4 I think
he exaggerates the significance of judicial deliberation. I note that
until quite recently, English judges did not engage in deliberationthey were forbidden to do so by the rule of "orality": everything a
judge did was to be done in public so that the public could monitor

judicial behavior. 5 Yet the product of these nondeliberating judges
was highly regarded; nor am I aware that the decline of orality in the
English

legal

system-a

product

of increased

workload-has

improved the system. (In fairness, though, the extreme length of
English appellate proceedings by U.S. standards may have provided a
substitute for deliberation-each judge on the appellate panel had

12. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1900; see also id. at 1898-901, 1946 ("[Siome
play for inherently contestable political judgments is simply built into law and strikes us as a
normal constituent of good judging.").
13. See my book, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999), for a
skeptical account of moral reasoning.
14. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1949.
15.

See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED

STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 101-03 (1990).
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much more time than his American counterpart to think about a
case.)
The problem with judicial deliberation in the American context
is the heterogeneity of American judiciaries. Judges do not select
their colleagues or successors; nor are the judges of a court selected
for the same reasons or on the basis of the same criteria. Even when
all the judges on an appellate panel were appointed by the same
president (which is infrequent), the appointments will have been
influenced by considerations that are unrelated to the likelihood that
the appointees will form a coherent deliberating entityconsiderations such as the recommendations of a Senator, the quest
for diversity, even political services, and campaign contributions.
Further evidence for my reservations concerning the
productiveness of judicial deliberation is the curiously stilted
character of deliberation. The judges speak their piece, usually
culminating in a statement of the vote they are casting, either in order
of seniority or reverse order of seniority, depending on the court, and
it is a serious breach of etiquette to interrupt a judge when he has the
floor. This structured discussion reflects the potential awkwardness of
a freewheeling discussion among persons who are not entirely
comfortable arguing with each other because they were not picked to
form an effective committee, and, as an aspect of the diversity that
results from the considerations that shape judicial appointments, may
have sensitivities that inhibit discussion of relevant issues involving
race, sex, religion, criminal rights, immigrants' rights, and other areas
that arouse strong emotions. Judicial deliberation can be highly
productive when the issues discussed are technical in character, rather
than entangled with moral or political questions frank discussion of
which is likely to produce animosity-but cases that raise issues that
all the judges agree are technical tend not to be the cases that shape
the law, that make it what it is.
7. Why Should Judges Be Legalists? The legalists, while strongly

committed to the view that most judges are legalists, do not offer a
theory of why it is plausible to expect judges in our system to be
legalists. Anyone who has studied professional behavior, including
the behavior of academics, knows that self-interest, along with
personality and, yes, in many fields (including law!), politics plays a
role in their behavior. Why would we not expect that to be true with
respect to judges? Are they saints by birth or continuous prayer? Are
they made saints by being appointed to the bench? Does a politicized
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selection process select for saints? Does putting on the robe change
the man or woman under it? The realistic view of judges is that they
care about the same things that other people care about, including
salary, benefits, how hard they work, and how well they are treated
by their colleagues. They thus have "leisure preference" and "effort
aversion," but also a desire to be respected and influential. They thus
respond to incentives and constraints, like other people; from the
assumption that they are like other people, the hypotheses of the
realistic approach derive. The effects of lifetime tenure must surely be
factored in when modeling judicial behavior. The critics have not
explained how it is that federal judges are made over into baseball
umpires.
There are expectations concerning the judicial role; there is a
degree of self-selection and, in any event, persons uncomfortable in
the role are unlikely to seek a judgeship or remain a judge; there is an
appreciation for legal values that is inculcated by legal training and
reinforced by experience as a lawyer. Judges are not just like other
people, or, in what I have described as their "legislative" role, just
like members of Congress. But a properly nuanced model of selfinterested human behavior can, I believe, explain much of what they
do in their judicial role.
To conclude this brief response: Much but by no means all of the
apparent disagreement dissolves if proper weight is given to
concessions on both sides. I concede and indeed would emphasize
that most judicial decisions are indeed "legalistic," but would add
merely that legalistic decisionmaking is consistent with realism. I
further concede, appealing to the concept of cognitive dissonance,
that most judges do not think of themselves in "realist" terms; but I
regard judicial introspection as a source of hypotheses about judicial
behavior rather than as evidence for the best explanation of that
behavior. And I insist that one must distinguish between the rhetoric
and the reality of judicial decisionmaking. But I certainly agree that
the political party of the appointing president is an exceedingly crude
proxy for the values that drive judicial decisionmaking in legalistically
indeterminate cases-yet, crude as it is, it has, as I mentioned earlier,
considerable explanatory value-which is inconsistent with the
legalistic view of judicial decisionmaking. And it is also improvable."

16. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal
Judges:A Note on Policy and PartisanSelection Agendas, 54 POL. REs. 0. 623, 628 (2001).
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The authors in their turn concede that a significant fraction of all
appellate cases cannot be resolved by an approximation to deduction
from the orthodox legal materials of text and precedent, but only by
appeal to moral and political considerations. 7 (I consider their 5 to 15
percent estimate of such cases high!)
The residual difference between us appears to be twofold. Judge
Edwards and Mr. Livermore overstate (I believe) the role of
deliberation in judicial decisionmaking, and, a closely related point,
the possibility of objective moral and political reasoning. Moral and
political reasoning as generally practiced, certainly at the judicial
level, is not an analytic process, but an expression of values shaped by
temperament, personal experiences, and religious and political
beliefs. Deliberation will not bridge the interpersonal gaps created by
value disagreements in a morally heterogeneous society.

17.

See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1898.
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